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ABSTRACT  
Online auctions were the most notable survivors of the ‘Internet Bubble Burst’ phenomenon that hit e-commerce related 
businesses at the turn of the millennium. With most online auctions lasting between 1 and 9 days, not all bidders have the 
time to monitor the progress of an auction for such long periods. In addition, many bidders in online auctions are new to the 
bidding game, leaving them at a disadvantage in the bidding process. Bidding agents that can place bids in the absence of a 
bidder can ameliorate the deficiencies of this mercantile process. In this paper we review the various bidding agents presently 
used by various auction houses and classify them based on their characteristics. We critique the bid composition process of 
bidding agents and the incentives for bidders to use them.  We also contrast the functionality of existing online bidding 
agents and proposed theoretical models.  
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INTRODUCTION 
As an effort to add value to the online auction mercantile process, online auction companies provide access to automatic 
bidding agents and auction management software for participating clients’.  Initially, the development of automated bidding 
agents was aimed at providing bidders in online auctions with participation options that would potentially reduce the 
opportunity cost of participating in online auctions. This was appealing because the online auctions tended to take longer than 
their traditional counterparts, and thus, the opportunity cost of participating in online auctions was high. However, as the size 
and popularity of the online auction market grew, the complexity of participating in online auctions increased. For example, 
simultaneous auctions with substitutable items are commonplace, and bidders have an incentive to leverage the performance 
of one auction to another in their favor. Intelligent bidding agents that are capable of maximizing bidders’ participation utility 
in such complex market environments have become a virtue.  
In this paper, we take stock of bidding agents that are currently being used on various online auction sites. We study the 
services they provide as well as their design. We provide a classification of bidding agents for online auctions. The 
classification identifies three distinct classes of bidding agents: Auction Site Bidding Agents (ASBA); Third Party Hosted 
Agents (TPBA), and Desktop Bidding Agents (DTBA).  We list examples of agents currently found in each of these 
categories and provide a summary of the services that each agent provides. Finally, we analyze the different bidding agents 
and make proposals for their improvement. Our classification and analysis of the bidding agents is based on economic theory 
of incentive alignment (Ba, Stallaert, Whinston, 2001; Ito, Hattori, Shintani. 2003). 
In the rest of the paper we review pertinent literature, identify the various features and the services offered by the bidding 
agents, classify them based on the service providers and provide insights and critique in to their working. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Bidding agents for online auctions were initially developed to replace fairly procedural bidding functions. With the increased 
use of online auctions as a mercantile process, the need for more sophisticated bidding agents that mimic real bidders has 
become apparent (Gregg and Walczak, 2003). In an experimental game that tested the performance of different bidding 
agents (Greenwald and Stone, 2001) the best scoring agents had aggressive bidding strategies and risk in their portfolio 
management. This experiment indicates that bidding agents will need to incorporate information processing capabilities that 
build up a knowledge base enabling bidders to intelligently deviate from a price takers strategy, where the markets sets a 
price for the product and the bidder is not in a position to influence it.  
A competitive bidding agent that uses private information in bidding, a price modeling agent that uses the price histories in 
determining its bidding strategies, and a bidder modeling agent that uses the bidding histories of other bidders in determining 
its own bidding strategies have been modeled (Hu, Reeves, Wong, 1999). Their findings on the performance of these bidding 
agents show that good agents will have to utilize multiple strategies that require different sources of data. 
There are numerous examples in the literature of bidding agents that are able to learn from the auction environment (Viet and 
Czernohous, 2003; Dumas, Aldred, Governatori, Hofstede and Russell, 2002; Jalali-Sohi and Malkewitz, 2001). These 
studies utilize Bayesian networks to represent the auction information and provide different applications of the acquired 
knowledge in the creation of bidding rules and strategies for automated bidding agents. We find a big gap between the 
current practice in the implementation of bidding agents and the proposed theoretical models. 
Most of the literature on bidding agents has focused on agents that participate in single auctions. However, online auctions 
have been observed to occur simultaneously. That is, it has become common place to identify more than one auction for a 
similar or substitutable product running at the same time. One common bidding strategy in such situations is to hedge the 
participation in one auction to the performance of another auction (Plott and Salmon, 2004; Anthony, 1999). 
Finally, we would like to highlight the importance of human agent inter-play in the bidding environment. While most of the 
studies that model bidding agents assume that bidding agents will be competing against other bidding agents, typical online 
auctions entertain participation from both bidding agents and human bidders. This interplay of agents and human beings 
infuses additional complexities to the auction agent design (Garcia, Lopes, Bentes, 2001). 
 
 
 
CURRENT STATE OF BIDDING AGENTS 
We turn our attention to the current state of bidding agents for online auctions and discuss their features and services. The 
bidding agents list was compiled through online search and message board browsing on auction houses1 and sites that provide 
downloads of freeware, shareware and trial software for auctions2. We identified the various features and services that these 
agents provide to the bidders and classified then in to three groups based on the service provider.  
Features and Services of Bidding Agents 
All bidding agents require some start-up steps to be undertaken by the bidder. The most important step is to choose the 
maximum bid value. The maximum bid serves as a reservation bound on a bidder’s willingness to pay. Bidding agents 
continuously submit a bid on behalf of the bidder, whenever the bidder is outbid and the winning bid is below the reservation 
price. This iterative process continues until the participating bidder has either won the auction or the bid is above his 
reservation price.  
This basic service of incremental bidding provided by the bidding agents is supplemented by a variety of additional services 
at different levels in different bidding agents. In this section we describe the services provided by different agents, and later 
provide a classification of bidding agents. 
1. Continuous Automatic Bidding: When the bidder chooses the bidding agent as a proxy, the agent takes over the bidding 
responsibilities by continuously ensuring that the bidder is winning the auction at the lowest possible winning bid. All 
the identified participate by submitting the minimum required bid below the reservation price.  
                                                 
1 www.ebay.com;amazon.com;auctions.yahoo.com;ubid.com; 
2 www.ebaysofwarereview.com 
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2. Max-Price Retraction: Max-Price retraction is defined as the feature of an auction agent, which would either allow or 
restrict the users from changing their maximum price limit (the reservation price or the maximum willingness to pay). 
Since the length of online auctions varies between a few hours to up to ten days, the bidder’s ability to modify his 
reservation price over time is significant. All the auction agents allow a user to modify the max-price limit anytime 
during the auction as long as the new revised reservation price is above the current bid.  
3. Sniping: Sniping is a biding strategy where bidders wait until the final moments of the auction to place their bid. When 
the auction duration is fixed, this strategy maximizes the bidder surplus since counter bids from competing bidders will 
be time barred by the auctioneer.  
4. Automatic Feedback: This is feature of convenience provided by third party bidding agents that allow a bidder to track 
winning auctions and consequently leave feedback for the seller. The agents prompt the user to leave feedback when 
ever they are used thus reducing the chances of the user overlooking feedback submissions, which has lead to the other 
party in the transaction leaving negative or neutral feedback for the user being a poor communicator.  
5. Automatic notification of Winning or losing bid:  Automatic notification is a feature of bidding agents that 
communicates the results of an auction with the bidder, using alternative modes of communication like e-mail. Two 
messages commonly communicated; (i) when the bidder is losing and the auction price exceeded the bidder’s reservation 
price; and (ii) when the auction closes, the agent sends a message informing the bidder of the auction outcome. 
6. Feedback Filter: Many sellers on auction houses like eBay and Yahoo have feedbacks running into thousands, which 
makes it difficult for bidders to go through each page searching for the negative and neutral feedbacks. Many third party 
automatic bidding agents help the bidder overcome this problem by gathering and displaying the neutral and negative 
feedbacks about the seller, thus giving the bidder insight into particular problems that others had with that seller. 
7. Multiple Auction Monitoring: The agent could be configured to monitor multiple auctions for a substitutable item and 
participate in one auction at a time. It would stop its monitoring as well as participation in the other auctions when the 
bidder has won one of the auctions below his reservation price.  
8. Usage cost: Agents provided by the auctioneers are free and the users are encouraged to use bidding agents for 
participating in auctions. Third party agents charge a fee as monthly subscription (Powersnipe.com, Auctionsniper.com) 
or commission or percentage of the winning bid (eSnipe.com) or one time software licensing fee as is the case of most 
desktop bidding agents (Cricket Jr., Auction Sentry etc…).  
9. Shill-Bid Activity Detection: Shill bidding is the process where the auctioneer’s proxy participates in the auction to drive 
the price up. Some of the third parties bidding agents provide options to bidders to search all the previous and current 
available auctions of a seller, looking for suspicious activity like a single bidder bidding in many of the sellers’ auctions 
indicating possible shill-bid activity.  
Classification of Bidding Agents 
Intelligent E-Commerce Agents as described by Wagner and Turban (2002), present a broad variety of agents that have been 
classified or organized based on the functions they perform like search, buy, sell, and negotiate. Wang (1999) broadly 
classifies the functions that need to be supported in E-Commerce in to eight distinct categories, which in turn are 
accomplished, by an individual or a group of Intelligent Agents. They have also been organized in to three distinct groups by 
Maes et al. (1999) depending on the functions they perform in the CBB (Consumer Buyer Behavior), with each group 
corresponding to one of the stages in CBB (Product Brokering, Merchant Brokering and Negotiation). Hendler (1999) also 
attempts a general classification of the agents by function in to Problem-solving agents, User-Centric agents, Control agents 
and Transaction agents. In this paper we look at the bidding agents and attempt to classify the existing bidding agents based 
on their functionality and service provider, which are critical for buyers surplus maximization and auctioneer revenue 
maximization. Even though each bidding agent has a distinct advantage in comparison with the other group, we will try to 
analyze each type based on whose advantages outweigh the others.  
The current online auction market place is being serviced by bidding agents that fall in three distinct categories. The first 
category is made up of agents that are owned and operated by the auctioneers. We refer to these as Auction Site Bidding 
Agents (ASBA’s). These agents require bidders to indicate the maximum price that they are willing to bid in an auction. 
Some online auctions call it the bidder’s reservation price. If a bidder’s reservation price for an item is higher than the current 
winning bid, the auction site provides the bidder with the services of a bidding agent that continuously bids on user’s behalf. 
Each time that a bidder is outbid, the bidding agent submits bids that conform to the auctioneers minimum required bid. This 
process repeats until the auction closes or the bid value is higher than the bidder’s indicated reservation price.  
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               Features/Services Provided by Agents (1– 9) Agent Name 
(Web Site) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Ebay          Free 
Yahoo         Free 
Ubid        Free 
Amazon        Free 
 
Figure 1: Services Provided by Auction Site Bidding Agents1 
 
Based on the services described under Features and Service of Bidding Agents, ASBA’s provide bidders with continuous 
bidding (1), automatic notification of change in auction status (5), and capability to monitor multiple auctions (7). Even 
though these agents are free to use, they restrict the bidder’s ability to lower his/her reservation price once submitted, even if 
it is above the current winning bid.  
The second class of bidding agents is the Third Party Bidding Agents (TPBA). These are independent dedicated web servers 
that run or parse the software agents that bid on behalf of the auction participant. They function independent of the auction 
houses and have no affiliation with them. All except one among the TPBA’s, service bidders participating on eBay.com 
alone. Perplexed by this lack of third party bidding agents for other auction sites, we contacted a service provider 
(www.sniperight.com), who explained that only ebay.com has enough bidder volume for the development of a bidding agent 
to make economic sense. The exception was eSnipe that provides services for bidders on both eBay and Yahoo based on 
custom requests. Figure 2 below, summarizes the services provided by the different agents that we found in this class.  
From the table below we can see that all the TPBA’s provide services for Continuous Automatic Bidding (1), Maximum 
price retraction (2) and Sniping (3)3. Automatic Notification of winning or losing bid (5) and Multiple Auction Monitoring 
(7) are provided by all the TPBA’s except eSnipe, which we found out to be a basic sniping service for eBay and Yahoo with 
out any other features that other TPBA’s provide.  Among the TPBA’s, Bidnapper and PhantomBidder provide the most 
comprehensive set of features and services that that includes Automatic Feedback (4) and Feedback Filter (6). All the 
TPBA’s charge a fee from the user based on the final auction winning price or monthly subscription for the usage of their 
services. It is also important to mention that the commission that these agents charged the user for winning the auction was 
not significant and generally was capped between $5 and $10. 
 
The last class of bidding agents is the Desktop Bidding Agents (DTBA). These agents reside on the bidder’s computer and 
retrieve auction information from the auction site. The current DTBA’s use what is popularly called scraping approach 
(requiring a separate script for retrieving information from each auction house) to communicate with the auction house. We 
observed that the service providers have generally been reliable in providing software upgrades based on changes made by 
the auction house to its standards.  
The DTBA’s provide most of the features and services that other bidding agents provide. One of the often cited drawbacks of 
the DTBA’s by their competitors is that the bidder has to leave the computer turned on and connected to the internet the 
whole auction time. Some of the DTBA’s try to overcome this drawback by designing their agents to be able to connect to 
the internet a few minutes before the auction ends and start bidding on the item. Even though this counters part of the 
argument of the competitors, it still does not overcome the problem of the bidder remembering to turn on the computer before 
the auction. The DTBA providers charge users a one time licensing fee or a yearly fee for their use. All the DTBA’s observed 
here provide most of the services listed with the exception being Bidslayer. 
                                                 
3 Even though all of the TPBA’s give the option of retracting the maximum bid limit, they restrict this option to a few 
minutes before the auction.  
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Features/Services Provided by Agents (3.1.1 – 3.1.9) 
Agent Name 
1 2 3 4 
 
5 6 7 8 9 
 
Target Site 
Auction Sniper        % Winning Bid  eBay 
eSnipe        % Winning Bid  eBay, yahoo 
Bidnapper        Subscription Option  eBay 
Phantom Bidder        Fixed Price/ Winning bid  eBay 
Powersnipe         Subscription Option  eBay 
Bidslammer        % Winning Bid  eBay 
 
Figure 2: Services Provided by Third Party Hosted Bidding Agents 
 
Features/Services Provided by Agents (3.1.1 – 3.1.9) 
 
INSIGHTS AND CRITIQUE 
Bidding agents will continue to play a central role in the online auction business. Although their model has evolved in 
tandem with technological developments of the internet infrastructure, our research on existing auction bidding agents shows 
that developments in this budding industry still lag behind the theoretical proposals of bidding agents that have been 
advanced. In this section, we provide insights into some of these differences, their causes, and propose remedial measures to 
overcome this difference. We discuss these insights under (i) auctioneer incentives to support bidding agents; (ii) 
diversification of bidding strategies; and (iii) intermediation incentives. 
 
Auctioneer Incentives to Support Bidding Agents 
The dominant players in the online auction market have a significant impact in the success of supporting innovations, such as 
bidding agents. We have seen that the ASBA’s have flourished, mainly because they have the blessings of their parent 
auction sites. However TPBA’s and DTBA’s, where we believe the future lies, are struggling to interact with auction sites. 
The development of integration standards and protocols for third party agents is a crucial cooperative initiative that is 
required of online auctioneers in order to create an enabling environment for the development of online auction bidding 
Agent Name 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Target 
Site 
Cricket Jr. Fixed eBay 
Auction Sentry Fixed eBay 
Bidslayer Fixed eBay 
Sniperight /Year eBay 
Figure 3: Services Provided by Desktop Bidding Agents 
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agents. Although such standards and protocols are required, they will open up both challenges and opportunities we discuss 
here. Our analysis indicates that the incentives for supporting online bidding agents, especially third part bidding agents, are 
not apparent to the auctioneers. 
Third party agents pose a significant business challenge to the online auction business.  These third party agent sites can 
easily transform into aggregator sites that would use automatic search agents to sift through various auction offers, collect 
information and display it on their websites. Ebay.com successfully sued an aggregator site in 2000 citing various reasons, 
which it claimed were harmful for its business. Among the reasons advanced by EBay were that the these sites displayed 
outdated information which lowed auction users purchasing experience, and at the same time overloaded EBay’s own servers 
through frequent use of their search agents (Wagner and Turban, 2002). 
The second challenge that third party agents pose to the auction house is that, by intermediating consumer access to the 
auction website, they could potentially affect advertising revenue which is a significant portion of the revenues in the online 
auction industry (ebay.com reported 7% ($54.9 Million) of net revenues from online advertising in 2002).  
On the positive side, establishment of standards and protocols for cooperative bidding agent interaction will see the 
development of third party auction bidding agents, in an environment that is devoid of incentive conflicts between bidders 
and auctioneers that plague the ASBA’s, giving bidder an incentive to disclose their true willingness to pay and set higher 
reservation prices. 
Standardization will also provide a potential for the creation of agents that can participate in multiple auctions. This would 
expose the auction to a larger audience and increase participation in the auction. Although there is the concern that the 
bidders could hedge their reservation price to the lowest price in all the auctions they are participating in, the exposure to a 
larger audience in itself is good for ascending price auctions (Klemperer 2003). 
Bidding agents will inevitable reduce the number of personal visits that bidders make to the auction sites, perhaps to a 
maximum of two visits. During first visit the bidder will identify and evaluate the item on offer. Using this information, other 
private and secondary information, the bidder will proceed to configure the bidding agent. The bidder may make a second 
personal visit to collect post auction information, which the bidding agent did not communicate. We do not preclude the 
possibility of other visits, especially depending on the features of the bidding agent, but this typical bidder-agent-auction 
interaction serves to underscore the effect of reduced click through rates that auctioneers fear might affect their online 
advertising revenues. It is worthy to note that this trend will be witnessed for all agent supported bidding activity including 
that of ASBA’s that are supported by the auction site.  In supporting standardized agent protocols, the shift of agent bidding 
activity will be from ASBA’s to TPBA’s and DTBA’s, which are more aligned with bidder’s incentives and will not have 
any net effect on the expected click through rates and hence advertising revenue.   
In an environment where flexible standards and protocols for agent-auction interaction exist, auction sites that are fearful of 
the uncontrolled practices of autonomous third parties bidding agents, can establish sister companies that handle the bidding 
agent work. With an appropriate business model, these entities can maximize their revenues, while serving the bidders’ as 
their principal.   
 
Diversification of Bidding Strategies 
There are two bidding strategies that are currently offered by the bidding agents that we studied: (i) minimum required bid 
and (ii) Sniping.  With the minimum required bid strategy, the bidding agent submits a bid that is equal to the minimum 
required bid set by the auctioneer. This strategy is optimal if all bidders use the same strategy. However, a typical online 
auction will have a mix of bidders using agents and some who physically participate in the auction and adopt more complex 
bidding strategies. In such an environment, using the minimum bid increment may result in sub-optimal results.  
Sniping strategies optimize the bidders expected surplus by submitting the minimum required bid close to auction end time. 
This is a strategy practiced widely in the non-agent online auction environment (Bapna et.al 2001). When a number of agents 
are configured to snipe on behalf of their bidders, the probability of winning reduces and in an auction format where the 
closing time is extended based on bidding activity, sniping results in intense bidding activity towards the end of the auction, 
without any significant advantage to any of the bidding agents. There is also a chance of the sniping strategy causing 
discontent for the auctioneer and there have been instances of negative feedback left for snipers (www.sniperight.com). Some 
of the latest sniping tools try to shield the user from these negative reactions of the auctioneer by sending small probing bids 
through out the auction with out causing a significant change in the auction price. Regardless of these modifications, we do 
not see any strategic advantages that the current bidding strategies provide to the principals. 
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There are numerous theoretical proposals for agent biddings strategies based on adaptive bidding strategy and q-learning 
(Viet and Czernohous, 2003; Greenwald and Stone, 2001). These agents utilized a variety of bidding strategies, some akin to 
the sniping strategy already discussed, while others employed more sophisticated strategies that utilize artificial intelligence 
heuristics to determine optimal bidding strategies. Additionally, these agents were developed to participate in combinatorial 
auctions. A proposal where bidders in simultaneous auctions submit bids driven by two principles: surplus maximization and 
bid minimization, lend itself easily to agent automation (Plott and Salmon, 2003).  Indeed, there are numerous theoretical 
proposals that serve as a base for the development of bidding agents that utilize diverse bidding strategies. The challenge 
remains to bring these agent proposals to fruition, by integrating them into bidding agents used in online auctions. Part of the 
challenge as discussed above has been the need for a co-operative effort to create an enabling environment by setting up 
standards and protocols for the interaction of bidding agents and the auction sites. 
 
Intermediation Incentives 
One positive development in the bidding agent field has been the creation of third party enterprises that provide bidding agent 
services. Agents of third party entities such as Auction Sniper, Bidnapper, and PhantomBidder provide users with web 
interfaces that allow bidders to configure them and agents such as Cricket Jr and Auction Sentry are software that can be 
downloaded onto bidder’s computers and configured to proxy bid. On observing the services that these agents provide, the 
limitation that we mention in sections 4.1 and 4.2 are evident. 
These developments, although in their nascent stage, are significant because the overall business model is sustainable and the 
incentives are well aligned.  Note that effective and efficient bidding agents have bidders as their principal and have to 
optimize the bidder’s objective. The bidder’s principal objective is to win an auction at the lowest possible price. When the 
agent development business is left to the auctioneer, he will provide support and develop features that support the 
auctioneers’ objective, which is to extract the maximum surplus from bidders, and in the process maximize revenue.  Thus 
we can argue that a feasible business framework for the development of bidding agents exits and it is away from the 
auctioneer.  
CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
From our review of existing bidding agents for online auctions, we conclude that there is significant gap between the 
‘theoretically proposed and experimentally tested agents’ and ‘existing online bidding agents’. This observation is especially 
supported by the fact that online auctions provide only one type of bidding agent that use a static minimum bid increment to 
compose bids.  Recent improvements in internet technologies create an enabling environment for the deployment of more 
sophisticated third party bidding agents.  
Bidding agent service in online auctions have traditionally been provided by the auction houses, creating an obvious conflict 
of information sharing between the auctioneer and the bidder.  In our review, we identified several emerging third party 
bidding agents that will result in increased bidder confidence, because the agents will be more aligned to the objectives of 
their principals. The development of third party bidding agents is however limited by the co-operation of auction houses to 
provide interfaces that can facilitate the integration of third-party bidding agents.  Auctioneers can provide Web-Services that 
support the development of third party bidding agents. Besides addressing the exact specifications of such Web-Service, it 
has to be clear to the auctioneers that the resultant auction environment will benefit them. We are currently undertaking 
research in this aspect. 
Finally, we observed that companies in the online auction business accrue some revenues from advertising. Naturally, the 
scope for this business opportunity is inversely related to the extent to which bidding agents are used. By reviewing the 
financial statements of some of the online auction companies, it was evident that the streams of advertising revenues have 
recently been declining.  From a business opportunity perspective, the exact benefits of enhanced use of bidding agents will 
have to be evaluated against such losses. 
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